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Posts tagged ‘the Austerity taxes in Ieland’

We the people of Ireland support Greece!

By Thomás Aengus O Cléirigh

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WE the people of Ireland have been enslaved by unelected European officials and their real masters faceless money-men who have taken the power on themselves to create money out of thin air and use this power to financially enslave whole countries: Today we as a country are bankrupt with ever increasing debt accumulation caused be the penal interest on private debts forced on to the backs of our people : we can NEVER hope to pay this ODIOUS debt : The time has come to accept reality : With 150,000,000,000: already gone up in thin air we need to ask the hard questions and indeed ask the real questions the puppets in the Irish Government are not asking as they are in the pay of the faceless money-men: They have shown themselves to be puppets, and traitors to the people of Ireland!

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It has taken a Greek man to stand up and call on the rest of Europe to face reality: This financial enslavement of the people’s of Europe is not a system we want for ourselves or our future generations: Our democracy is gone and we are now commodities to be milked for every cent a corrupt government can get out of us : we have no lives other than constant fear of the next bill and constant juggling of the merger few Euros we manage to keep from the corrupt imposed austerity taxes: This Greek mans speaks the truth as we the ordinary people know it to be and deserves our support in his efforts!

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The real question is where did this money go? That is 150 billion????? The bank bondholders got bailed out! They do not have the right to take people’s homes as these mortgages were paid off Correct?????These billions did not go into the pockets of Ordinary Joe! Can you imagine what the country would look like if it was spent on infrastructure, schools, retraining the unemployed, or invested in our water infrastructure, or what about a massive investment in our health services and education? So we the taxpayers took on private debts from our Irish banks and a lot more debt ( European bank debts as well) we paid 48% of the total European debt and what did we get the people get out of this deal NOTHING but AUSTERITY TAXES like the Universal social charge, slashed health services, ,Property taxes ,23 various new stealth taxes and the latest one is water charges not to mention the world’s largest Quango that has cost the taxpayers so far 3,700,000,000:Billion and counting :

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These are NOT my figures these are government figures the real figures could be double that ! WHERE DID THIS 150,000.000.000: go ??????????? and why are we even paying this in the first place since these debts have materialized out of thin air the money lent came from the push of a button! SO I now say push another button and delete this debt!

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Let us support the Greek people in our common struggle to bring back reality, democracy and freedom to live a life free of the financial debts of faceless money-men: Let us live for the joy of living and not for the fear of never ending debt slavery!

 

patrick-honohan-why-i-let-bailout-cat-out-of-the-bag (“Yep! I was just obeaying orders and a dead man gave the orders! How conveniente!

By late August (2010), as the laborious process of NAMA valuations began to reveal the even larger haircuts required on the rest of the loans it was taking over, not only was the scale of prospective banking losses gaining more international attention, but the insufficiency of the fiscal adjustment was also becoming undeniable. Lenders in the financial markets were becoming doubtful.

Brian Lenihan knew well that September 2010 was going to be a testing month for the Irish banks, as they would have their work cut out to persuade lenders and depositors to rollover the large block of bank claims maturing in the last weeks of the original guarantee (which had been for two years only and, therefore, was due to expire at the end of September).

All of official Dublin knew that it was highly unlikely that a rollover would be successfully accomplished, leaving Anglo and, indeed, potentially other banks dependent on the Central Bank’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance.

Already at the end of July, I had taken care to make the ECB fully aware of how this situation was shaping up, knowing that they would be uneasy about the prospect, as ELA is supposed to be a short-term facility. Nevertheless, it was the inexorable growth in ELA from the middle of September that would induce ECB staff and Council to press for Ireland’s application for a programme of official financial assistance (ie. a bailout).

For a hammer, every problem is a nail, and most external official observers held fiscal hammers and assumed that fiscal tightening was the sole and necessary solution to the emerging Irish problem. By mid-September, Brian acknowledged that more fiscal action was going to be needed, even if it took several more weeks before official Dublin converged on a level of adjustment which would see the government’s finances restored to a safe path. But fiscal adjustment was never going to solve the banks’ problem if their funding continued to drain away.

While Brian fought a rear-guard battle against European fiscal hawks, in particular, resisting their pressure for an early budget, the Central Bank worked to persuade international colleagues to desist from market-destabilising statements that continued to fuel the deposit drain.

At the early-October IMF annual meetings, planning for a possible Irish funding application was already under way. At meetings with IMF officials, Brian asked what sort of conditions might a loan application entail and was reassured, by the tone conveyed by those on the other side – who would soon form the nucleus of the IMF Troika team for Ireland – and by their message, that the existing thrust of announced Irish fiscal and financial policy was broadly consistent with what would likely materialise. Still far from ready to make such an application, it seemed that Brian had mentally crossed a barrier.

In terms of market confidence, the die was cast by the Merkel-Sarkozy announcement on October 18 at Deauville to the effect that the holders of European government debt would have to contribute to any bailout. As the financial markets absorbed the implications of this new policy, interest rates on all peripheral government debt, but especially Ireland – now clearly seen as next-in-line for a bailout – jumped to insupportable levels. Now, Irish companies and individuals joined the external investors in removing their funds from the Irish banking system and the need for the protection of official external assistance became acute. Public and semi-public statements and briefings by senior Eurozone officials to that effect added fuel to the fire.

By Thursday, November 4, as the government announced the outline of its revised four-year budgetary plan, it was clear to Brian’s Irish advisers that the game was likely up, and it did not take them long to convince Brian that it was time to talk to the Troika. I spoke to the relevant officials at the IMF and ECB and it was suggested that an early meeting be held in Brussels to see what might be available in the way of financial assistance.

By the middle of the following week, Brian had agreed that officials would conduct pre-negotiations on a programme – preferably precautionary in character. The IMF complained that it preferred to have a definite request before embarking on costly negotiations, but eventually agreed to proceed as if there had been a formal application. It was decided to hold the discussions in Brussels, as Brian did not want to have teams of negotiators in Dublin. The meeting was set for Sunday, November 14, and almost all of the 17-strong Irish team, led by the Department of Finance, flew over that morning.

Officials from the three agencies that made up the Troika had pre-negotiated, between themselves, much of what they had in mind, but their style in these initial negotiations with the Irish side was not to present demands, but instead to lay out what was legally possible in the terms of loans and the scale of financing they envisaged.

There were no surprises about the priorities. Fixing the banks and guaranteeing the fiscal adjustment were at the core of the Troika’s agenda.

The scale of the loan envisaged was even higher than we, on the Irish side, had anticipated, partly because the Troika wanted to provide for the eventuality of a very large capitalisation of the banks to a level which Irish officials thought would threaten debt sustainability of the sovereign. The Troika insisted, though, on two points: first, discussions could not go much further without a formal application, and second, the idea of a purely precautionary programme was out of the question.

Brian Lenihan was briefed by his officials on the two days of negotiations and was sufficiently convinced to agree that the negotiations should continue in Dublin on Thursday, November 18. Meanwhile, he came under much pressure from alarmed fellow ministers in the Eurogroup meeting on the Tuesday to make a formal application there and then.

I, too, was asked on Wednesday evening to let the Irish government know that the ECB Governing Council also wanted Ireland to apply in order to steady financial markets. I duly passed on the message by phone, but got a cross response from Brian, who rightly felt that all of the external actors were seeking to bounce him into formally making the application. He said he had no government approval to do so, but did not at all suggest that he was having second thoughts about the course that he had embarked upon. Instead, I assumed that he wanted to exploit the fact that no formal application had been made as a lever in the negotiations, which were scheduled to begin very visibly the following morning.

Noting the bewilderment evidenced in the European official circles, I became increasingly concerned that the financial market pressures, including the huge outflows from the banks, would cause lasting damage to the Irish economy.

Towards midnight that Wednesday, as the meeting I was attending broke up, I sounded out Frankfurt colleagues on whether they would support a statement by me indicating that the ECB was standing behind the Irish banking system, but in vain. Already, the following day’s editorial in the Financial Times had appeared online, speaking of a bank run in Ireland.

Things had got to the point where, had it remained silent on the state of play, the Central Bank would have not only failed in its responsibility to use timely communication to steady confidence, but would also have dashed a legitimate public expectation in Ireland that it could be trusted not to deceive through omission.

Fortunately, this could be avoided, despite the lack of any application from Ireland for assistance. Thus, though by now all on the Irish side regarded a programme as inevitable and Brian’s earlier hope that it could be a merely precautionary arrangement had now all but vanished, I made a point of explicitly leaving these two aspects -whether an application would be made and the possibility of a precautionary-only arrangement – open in the radio interview I undertook the following morning (Morning Ireland, Thursday, November 18).

The Troika remained in doubt about the government’s intentions and the interview, if anything, improved the negotiating atmosphere somewhat to our advantage. What had not occurred to me was that Brian might not, even by that stage, have communicated to some of his senior ministerial colleagues how far down the road the discussions had already gone. Clearly, the interview was inconvenient for him, but he understood, as he confirmed to me then and later, that my sole aim was to work in the national interest.

Despite all this, the ECB – still not fully convinced that an application would be made – felt it necessary to write to Brian the following day, warning that continued emergency lending by the Central Bank to the Irish banks could not be assured unless there were to be an application.

– See more at: http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/patrick-honohan-why-i-let-bailout-cat-out-of-the-bag-30621299.html#sthash.bY07OTL9.dpuf

Comment:
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“Yep! I was just obeying orders” and a dead man gave the orders! How convenient! 
So there you have it we the people ofIrelandwere blackmailed into takingtheso called bailout that is now forcing us to pay for water a third time ,the rape of our Natural resources and the impoverishing of our people in the process as selected collaborators are doing the bidding of the gangsters in the ECB  who have come in the guise of helping the people of Ireland ! All this is happening as the political  traitors reap huge rewards in Europe and those whostayare sent off into the sunset with lottery pensions and the people struggle to pay the austerity taxes to pay for it all!

Patrick Honohan is another collaborator and a traitor to Ireland on the make with his fat pension and now hopefully the revenue coming from his latest book ! I have had enough and will consider what options are open to me : Its is better to fight these parasites  or else they will suck us dry ! People of Ireland arise and take back our country from the Gangsters in Europe and the home grown parasites who are helping the ! Its time to stand and fight ! Repudiate this odious debt and send the bondholders cheerleaders to hell! Start with the gangsters in the photo above! Not one of these crooks have been sent to Jail ! But 3425 Irish citizens  have been sent to jail for not paying their TV licenses and other taxes and ESB bills! The Irish Government is no longer a government of the people but a terror instrument enforcing the penal taxes on the people of Ireland and they are no better than the Vichy  collaborators !
Is Mise le meas
Thomás O Cléirigh

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