On this edition of Keiser Report, Max and co-host Stacy Herbert look at the latest round of threats by bankers to take down the global economy; Citibank reassures investors that BP could survive multiple Deepwaters… at least, financially, but then there is that small matter of “US bloodlust”; and the revolution was not twittered. In the second half of the show, Max talks to Mike Ruppert about peak oil, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and his movie “Collapse
Posts tagged ‘Citi’
If like me you have become puzzled by the recent Market “events” you should find this excellent article sent to me to-day helpful
Following quite a number of requests from students and clients this brief will deal with my understanding of what transpired last Thursday the 6th. May when just after 2.30 PM the Dow Industrials collapsed by nearly 10% and then suddenly recovered in 11 minutes.
The implications of what occurred are far reaching and unless the regulatory issues are resolved we can expect similar “events” of like nature.
In the main to comprehend the situation in the “Market” one must realise that there are now many markets. In the good old days, in America, all we had was the New York Stock Exchange where real people dealt with real market makers in real time. But computers in general and the internet in particular have changed all that. In addition as well as the “public market” we now have the (OTC) Over the Counter Market. The OTC is basically a private market between banks and large institutions which has little or no active supervision. I find this development strange because the trading activity on the OTC is 60 trillion dollars annually, while turnover on the public market is 5 trillion. Now in addition to public markets and private markets let us now bring in “Dark Pools” to our explanation.
“Dark Pools” What are they? ” Dark pools of liquidity” are crossing networks that provide liquidity that is not displayed on order books. This situation is highly advantageous for institutions that wish to trade very large numbers of shares without showing their hand. Dark liquidity pools thus offer institutions many of the efficiencies associated with trading on the exchanges’ public limit order books but without showing their actions to other parties. This is achieved because neither the price nor the identity of the trading entity needs to be displayed. Many of the OTC “exchanges ” used by the dark pools use high frequency trading programmes to minimise order size and maximise order execution. Now you may think that this manner of doing business on the “stock market” is carried out by minor unknown entities but this is not the case. Below I list the Independent dark pools, the broker-dealer dark pools and exchange-owned dark pools.
Independent dark pools: Instinet, Smartpool, Posit, Liquidnet, Nyfix,Pulse Trading, RiverCross
and Pipeline Trading.
Broker-dealer dark pools: BNP Paribas, Bank of New York Mellon, Citi, Credit Suisse, Fidelity, Goldman Sachs, Knight Capital, Deutsch Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, USB, Ballista ATS, BlocSec and Bloomberg.
Exchange-owned dark pools: International Securities Exchange, NYSE Euronext, BATS Trading and Direct Edge.
When you understand that all the big players in banking and finance are using the OTC system and have a turnover 12 times that of the “public” markets you get to wonder why there is a New York Stock Exchange at all. Well you see there is a big difference between the OTC “private” market and the NYSE “public” market. The NYSE is comprised of market makers. These market makers are specialists who are obliged to buy and sell on their own and the publics’ account to create a liquid active market. The OTC market faces no such obligation. Over the past number of years attempts have been made to abolish the specialist role and remove the “human” engagement.
What happened on Thursday was the high frequency OTC trading programmes
created “trades” which did not make sense to the NYSE specialists. Accordingly the NYSE stopped handling orders so that the situation could be analysed. The OTC computerized networks then began rerouting orders to other “markets” and with no “public” markets participating prices collapsed through sell stops and the rest is history.
There are many lessons to be learned from this event. But for me the main question is whether a “market” that is only 8% “transparent” is actually a market (5 trillion as a ratio of 60 trillion). Going forward it is obvious that additional “circuit breakers” must be brought in to modify the exchange activity of high frequency dark pools. Whatever the eventual fallout from last Thursday’s events are it is clear that the issues I have touched upon are only the tip of the iceberg and any trader or investor worth his salt must reflect upon what happened and adjust his or her strategies appropriately.
Can You Believe There Are Still Analysts Arguing How Undervalued Goldman Sachs Is? Those July 150 Puts Say Otherwise, Let’s Take a Look
To begin with , Goldman Sachs produces more accounting revenue and accounting profits than its peers. This is because Goldman benefits from virtual monopoly pricing and advantages in several markets. Despite this advantage, when one factors in economic RISK and the cost of capital, Goldman doesn’t fare nearly as well as the sell side makes it seem. Of course, the sell side rarely attempts to quantify risk, which is cool until reality rears its (sometimes ugly) head. Before we get to risk adjust returns, let’s look at the simple accounting numbers and attempt to throw some logic on them…
Above, you see that GS has enjoyed a significant premium over its peers in terms of book valuation. This premium has actually increased over the past year. Let me be the one to remind you that no US company has every survived a criminal judgment, none. Arther Anderson was driven into bankruptcy from charges stemming from the Enron collapse, and that is despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned the guilty verdict! Assuming, for the benefit of the doubt, GS can somehow set precedence, or more realistically, criminal charges are not filed, we still have to contend with:
the SEC lawsuit
the increased regulation, in particular the Volcker rule and derivatives oversight
follow on litigation, which is virtually guaranteed, and virtually guaranteed to be extremely expensive, time consuming, and distracting from the core businesses.
a general decline in business since we are coming off of a credit and risky asset boom and going into a sovereign debt crisis that will make FICC much less predictable (seeThe Next Step in the Bank Implosion Cycle???
for a more on how this could end with the Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis drama unfolding).
Taking all of this into consideration, you tell me… Does Goldman really deserve to be trading at such a premium considering the myriad risks it is currently exposed to PLUS the murky business and regulatory environment? They are also losing talent on the sales side, and at the MD level to boot. Today’s market is starting to see things the Reggie Middleton way.
Now, let’s factor in some more reality. No matter what your broker says about accounting earnings and revenues, they don’t come free. They all have a cost of capital attached to them. Let’s reference an excerpt from When the Patina Fades… The Rise and Fall of Goldman Sachs???
GS return on equity has declined substantially due to deleverage and is only marginally higher than its current cost of capital. With ROE down to c12% from c20% during pre-crisis levels, there is no way a stock with high beta as GS could justify adequate returns to cover the inherent risk. For GS to trade back at 200 it has to increase its leverage back to pre-crisis levels to assume ROE of 20%. And for that GS has to either increase its leverage back to 25x. With curbs on banks leverage this seems highly unlikely. Without any increase in leverage and ROE, the stock would only marginally cover returns to shareholders given that ROE is c12%. Even based on consensus estimates the stock should trade at about where it is trading right now, leaving no upside potential. Using BoomBustBlog estimates, the valuation drops considerably since we take into consideration a decrease in trading revenue or an increase in the cost of funding in combination with a limitation of leverage due to the impending global regulation coming down the pike.
Remember, practically everybody poo-poohed my research and opinion in 2008 when I said Goldman was drastically overvalued – Reggie Middleton on Risk, Reward and Reputations on the Street: the Goldman Sachs Forensic Analysis. Those 600% to 1000% gains on the put options proved otherwise. Speaking of which, those July 150 puts… Can you smell what the forensic analysis is cookin’???