What is truth?

Posts tagged ‘Berkshire Hathaway’

former board member of Goldman Sachs, Rajat Gupta has been charged by the SEC with insider trading

Just what Goldman did not need: a former board member of Goldman Sachs, Rajat Gupta has been charged by the SEC with insider trading, related to the Galleon insider trading scheme. It seems, Gupta was also tipped off about Berkshire’s $5 billion investment in Goldman.

From the release:

Washington, D.C., March 1, 2011 – The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced insider trading charges against a Westport, Conn.-based business consultant who has served on the boards of directors at Goldman Sachs and Procter & Gamble for illegally tipping Galleon Management founder and hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam with inside information about the quarterly earnings at both firms as well as an impending $5 billion investment by Berkshire Hathaway in Goldman.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that Rajat K. Gupta, a friend and business associate of Rajaratnam, provided him with confidential information learned during board calls and in other aspects of his duties on the Goldman and P&G boards. Rajaratnam used the inside information to trade on behalf of some of Galleon’s hedge funds, or shared the information with others at his firm who then traded on it ahead of public announcements by the firms. The insider trading by Rajaratnam and others generated more than $18 million in illicit profits and loss avoidance. Gupta was at the time a direct or indirect investor in at least some of these Galleon hedge funds, and had other potentially lucrative business interests with Rajaratnam.

The SEC has previously charged Rajaratnam and others in the widespread insider trading scheme involving the Galleon hedge funds.

“Gupta was honored with the highest trust of leading public companies, and he betrayed that trust by disclosing their most sensitive and valuable secrets,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “Directors who violate the sanctity of board room confidences for private gain will be held to account for their illegal actions.”

In the order that institutes administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Gupta, the SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that, while a member of Goldman’s Board of Directors, Gupta tipped Rajaratnam about Berkshire Hathaway’s $5 billion investment in Goldman and Goldman’s upcoming public equity offering before that information was publicly announced on Sept. 23, 2008. Gupta called Rajaratnam immediately after a special telephonic meeting at which Goldman’s Board considered and approved Berkshire’s investment in Goldman Sachs and the public equity offering. Within a minute after the Gupta-Rajaratnam call and just minutes before the close of the markets, Rajaratnam arranged for Galleon funds to purchase more than 175,000 Goldman shares. Rajaratnam later informed another participant in the scheme that he received the tip on which he traded only minutes before the market close. Rajaratnam caused the Galleon funds to liquidate their Goldman holdings the following day after the information became public, making illicit profits of more than $900,000.

The SEC’s Division of Enforcement alleges that Gupta also illegally disclosed to Rajaratnam inside information about Goldman Sachs’s positive financial results for the second quarter of 2008. Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein called Gupta and various other Goldman outside directors on June 10, when the company’s financial performance was significantly better than analysts’ consensus estimates. Blankfein knew the earnings numbers and discussed them with Gupta during the call. Between that night and the following morning, there was a flurry of calls between Gupta and Rajaratnam. Shortly after the last of these calls and within minutes after the markets opened on June 11, Rajaratnam caused certain Galleon funds to purchase more than 5,500 out-of-the-money Goldman call options and more than 350,000 Goldman shares. Rajaratnam liquidated these positions on or around June 17, when Goldman made its quarterly earnings announcement. These transactions generated illicit profits of more than $13.6 million for the Galleon funds.

The Division of Enforcement further alleges that Gupta tipped Rajaratnam with confidential information that he learned during a board posting call about Goldman’s impending negative financial results for the fourth quarter of 2008. The call ended after the close of the market on October 23, with senior executives informing the board of the company’s financial situation. Mere seconds after the board call, Gupta called Rajaratnam, who then arranged for certain Galleon funds to begin selling their Goldman holdings shortly after the financial markets opened the following day until the funds finished selling off their holdings, which had consisted of more than 120,000 shares. In discussing trading and market information that day with another participant in the insider trading scheme, Rajaratnam explained that while Wall Street expected Goldman Sachs to earn $2.50 per share, he had heard the prior day from a Goldman Sachs board member that the company was actually going to lose $2 per share. As a result of Rajaratnam’s trades based on the inside information that Gupta provided, the Galleon funds avoided losses of more than $3 million.

As it pertains to insider trades by the Galleon funds in the securities of Procter & Gamble, the Division of Enforcement alleges that Gupta illegally disclosed to Rajaratnam inside information about the company financial results for the quarter ending December 2008. Gupta participated in a telephonic meeting of P&G’s Audit Committee at 9 a.m. on Jan. 29, 2009, to discuss the planned release of P&G’s quarterly earnings the next day. A draft of the earnings release, which had been mailed to Gupta and the other committee members two days before the meeting, indicated that P&G’s expected organic sales would be less than previously publicly predicted. Gupta called Rajaratnam in the early afternoon on January 29, and Rajaratnam shortly afterward advised another participant in the insider trading conspiracy that he had learned from a contact on P&G’s board that the company’s organic sales growth would be lower than expected. Galleon funds then sold short approximately 180,000 P&G shares, making illicit profits of more than $570,000.

Bank of America Corp share price

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) — Just because some high-profile investors have sold Bank of America Corp. shares recently doesn’t mean the average investor should follow. The charts suggest the stock might have some short-term lift.

The fund run by famed billionaire investor John Paulson disclosed it reduced its B. of A. /quotes/comstock/13*!bac/quotes/nls/bac (BAC 14.81, -0.03, -0.20%)  holdings by 10% during the fourth quarter, while Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway /quotes/comstock/13*!brk.a/quotes/nls/brk.a (BRK.A 127,440, +165.00, +0.13%)   /quotes/comstock/13*!brk.b/quotes/nls/brk.b (BRK.B 84.93, -0.03, -0.04%)  sold its entire stake.

Before investors blindly follow their Wall Street heroes, keep in mind the sales were completed as of Dec. 31, when the stock closed at $13.34. It soared 6.4% the very next session, and the low so far this year has been $13.40.

In addition, the stock’s technicals are behaving like they did just prior to some significant upward spikes over the past couple of years.

The moving average convergence-divergence indicator, known as the MACD, is a trend-following momentum indicator that oscillates around zero. It is constructed using two exponential moving averages — the MACD line and the MACD signal line.

The indicator produced a “buy” signal over the last week when the MACD line crossed over the MACD signal line. More importantly, this crossover occurred with both lines north of zero.

Similar positive crossovers occurred on March 24, 2010, Oct. 9, 2009, and on the 15th and 28th of July 2009. After those crossovers, B. of A. spiked as much as 13% in less than three weeks, 9.1% in a week and 30% in less than two weeks, respectively.

B. of A.’s technical makeup looks a lot more like it did in July 2009 because of the recent appearance of a “golden cross,” which is when the 50-day simple moving average crosses above the 200-day simple moving average. The last “golden cross” appeared just before the July 2009 MACD crossovers.

Some investors may be skeptical of a potential technical breakout because short interest dropped 31% in just two weeks to 79 million shares as of Jan. 31 settlement, meaning a lot of short-cover buying has already taken place. But current short-interest levels are similar to those seen at the time of the previous positive MACD crossovers, and are still more than double the lowest levels seen during the bull-market years of 2005 and 2006.

The stock was up 0.2% at $14.87 in afternoon trading Thursday, off an intraday low of $14.73. A potential MACD crossover spike would likely propel the stock through key resistance at the $15.30 to $15.40 level, which includes the January high and the 50% retracement level of the decline from the April 2010 high to the November 2010 low.

Other upside levels to watch include the June high of $16.10 and the gap in the charts between the May 14 high of $16.72 and the May 13 low of $16.85.

So instead of Buffett or Paulson, perhaps short-term investors should follow Appaloosa Management’s David Tepper. He made billions buying bank stocks in 2009, called the stock market’s rally since last September, and raised his stake in B. of A. by 12% during the fourth quarter.

Comment:

I bought BAC at $10.93 and expect the stock to continue  up to about $17.50 (current price is $ 14.81) I am also in Citi and i expect it to go to 6.50 in the coming months

Dow looks strong and should continue to climb the wall of worry ,we could see it reach 13500 -14000 and possible see ne all time highs before we see acorrection of 10%-15%

T

US Bond Bubble ready to pop

Understanding Credit default swaps

In the first video clip toward the end you heard we the taxpayers were taking over approximately 14,000,000,000:00 Billion worth of Derivatives or (CDS) from Anglo Irish Bank  alone!

(I personally believe that that figure to be near the 100,000,000:00 mark)

But most people do not know or understand what exactly these Derivatives are let alone understand them .So in the 2nd video clip you can get a crash course on the basics of CDS.

But the bottom line is Brian Cowen and Brian Lenihan could not possible know what they needed to know before taking on such obligations and there lies’ the crocks of the Irish financial meltdown.

Politicans, experts at waffling are making decision on complex financial instruments, that I have being studying for the last 12 years and still do not fully understand, but I know that they are like financial nuclear bombs and are best Instruments that should be avoided at all costs. They are unregulated and you are buying a pig and a poke.

Here is what Warren Buffet had to say about these unregulated financial tools .

In fielding a question about derivatives, which he once referred to as “financial weapons of mass destruction,” Mr. Buffett told shareholders that he expects derivatives and borrowing, or leverage, would inevitably end in huge losses for many financial participants.

“The introduction of derivatives has totally made any regulation of margin requirements a joke,” said Mr. Buffett, referring to the U.S. government’s rules limiting the amount of borrowed money an investor can apply to each trade. “I believe we may not know where exactly the danger begins and at what point it becomes a super danger. We don’t know when it will end precisely, but…at some point some very unpleasant things will happen in markets.”

Mr. Buffett has expressed similar bearish sentiments about derivatives in previous meetings and in his widely read annual letters to shareholders. He had first-hand experience with the difficulties of derivatives after Berkshire acquired General Re, the reinsurance company, in the late 1990s, and spent several years unwinding its derivatives portfolio at a loss to reduce the subsidiary’s exposure to risk. He noted, however, that Berkshire currently has several dozen derivatives positions — such as futures and options contracts on stock indexes and foreign currencies — and added that “derivatives aren’t evil.”

Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s 83-year-old vice-chairman and Mr. Buffett’s droll sidekick during the six-hour annual meeting, said that the accounting of derivatives contributed to the risks they pose to the financial markets.

“The accounting being deficient enormously contributes to the risk,” said Munger, lamenting that executives and shareholders were getting paid on “profits that don’t exist.”

Mr. Buffett noted that existing accounting conventions allow parties involved in derivative transactions to value the same contract differently, leading to an inadequate or incomplete picture of the contract’s risk. “I will guarantee you, if you add up the marks on both side, they don’t add up to zero,” Mr. Buffett said, referring to the accounting of a single derivative contract.

Exacerbating the problem of derivatives and leverage is the short-term trading mentality and high turnover in the stock and bond markets, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger added. “There is an electronic herd of people around the world managing an amazing amount of money” who make decisions based on minute-by-minute stimuli, said Mr. Buffett, adding, “I think it’s a fool’s game.”

Source http://seekingalpha.com/article/34606-buffett-on-derivatives-a-fool-s-game

So what has Cowen and Lenihan gotten us into ?

Derivatives ???


NEW YORK (Reuters) – Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc said fourth-quarter profit surged, helped by derivatives bets tied to global stock markets, though operating profit fell 40 percent as the weakened economy weighed on several businesses.

Profit rose for a third straight quarter, and full-year profit increased 61 percent, as Berkshire rebounded from perhaps its worst year since Buffett took over in 1965.

“I was quite impressed with the results,” said Vahan Janjigian, author of the book “Even Buffett Isn’t Perfect.”

“It is clearly suffering from the economic recession we have been in, but compared with most other companies involved in similar businesses, it is doing quite well,” he added.

In his annual letter to Berkshire shareholders, Buffett admitted that Berkshire’s ability to outperform that benchmark “has shrunk dramatically,” and that “our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.”

Net worth per share, which measures assets minus liabilities and is a key metric for Buffett, rose 19.8 percent, compared with a 9.6 percent drop a year earlier.

Still that lagged a 26.5 percent gain including dividends for the Standard & Poor’s 500, the first time it trailed since 2004. Berkshire’s net worth per share is up 20.3 percent annually since 1965, while the S&P 500 is up 9.3 percent. Total book value rose to $131.1 billion from $109.27 billion.

full story link

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61Q1IF20100227?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49:g43:r5:c0.100000:b31169752:z0

Have helped warren buffet to come in with substantial profits as fourth-quarter profits surged, helped by derivatives bets tied to global stock markets, though operating profit fell 40 percent as the weakened economy weighed on several businesses.
Profit rose for a third straight quarter, and full-year profit increased 61 percent, as Berkshire rebounded from perhaps its worst year since Buffett took over in 1965.

 

Derivatives have been the driving force for the enormous profits enjoyed by the major banks in the US in the last quarter as well

Now we see even Buffet is using them!

But on real economic activity nothing doing we are still in the dole drums and the only way the banks are going to give an encore with regards to their profits going forward is to keep using even bigger and riskier Derivatives bets

In other words “Gambling” all over again!

They will have to engineer another bubble and the stock market in the obvious choice so expect a massive turn in the markets soon

Place your bets here now!

Irish Banks Derivative trading losses

I believe that the banks Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank are all hopelessly exposed to huge losses as a result of Derivative trading

They should be asked to come clean and give categorical assurances on their Derivative Trading

Apart from the huge losses on their propriety /mortgages business.ie (subprime desaster),  there is another enormous source of losses from the same banks and that is their trading in the “BOND MARKET” again I believe that they have huge exposure here as well

These Banks have lent approximately 400 billion Euros and all of it borrowed from foreign banks, these funds would have had to have  “Hedging ” or have an insurance taken out ,in case of default !

So what kind of insurance did they get then if not Derivatives?

Derivatives typically have a large notional value. As such, there is the danger that their use could result in losses that the investor would be unable to compensate for. The possibility that this could lead to a chain reaction ensuing in an economic crisis, has been pointed out by famed investor Warren Buffett in Berkshire Hathaway‘s 2002 annual report. Buffett called them ‘financial weapons of mass destruction.’ The problem with derivatives is that they control an increasingly larger notional amount of assets and this may lead to distortions in the real capital and equities markets. Investors begin to look at the derivatives markets to make a decision to buy or sell securities and so what was originally meant to be a market to transfer risk now becomes a leading indicator.

These Derivatives were traded like confetti at a wedding and have about the same value now !

 If a bank goes bust, deals are just canceled and the residual amount is transferred to the legal department. Everyone can live with that. The burden is transferred from the agent (trading floor) to the principal (the shareholders). Because risk cannot be hedged properly by market professionals, it needs to be taken over by a succession of outsiders. If outsiders are not willing to play anymore (Derivative traders) or go bust, (AIG) then risk concentrates again inside the market, where it cannot be hedged and goes Bust.

So derivatives are only as safe as their underlying  risk is liquid and delta-hedgeable.

Brian Cowen was the Finance Minister who oversaw all this gambling activity at the major Irish banks and should be made accountable for the Total Destruction of the Irish financial industry 

Brian Lenihian  is colluding with the Greens to hide the catastrophic nature of the major Banks debts! Indeed I go so far as to say they may be kept in the dark as to the combined total losses which I estimate at Anglo Irish Bank to be somewhere north of 120 Billion Euros alone!

If I am wrong, then prove me wrong, by showing us the figures of Anglo Irish Bank .

Open the books let us see for ourselves

Don’t let anyone tell you that Anglo was nor dealing in Bonds or Derivative Products,

  I call on the Minister of Finance to come out on to the Dail floor and tell the Nation that the Irish Banks have no exposure to these Derivative Markets.

 But before you do I have a question for you!

Why was there this amendment made to the NAMA Legislation?

Page 15 of the draft NAMA legislation says that the definition of a “credit facility” includes instruments such as”a hedging or derivative facility.”  Section 56, starting on page 46, then defines eligible assets for purchase by NAMA as a range of different types of “credit facilities” as well as “any other class of bank asset (Derivatives) the acquisition of which, in the opinion of the Minister, is necessary for the purposes of this Act.”

Why is the National Treasury Management Agency actively looking to recruit a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to NAMA?

And before you deny that look below!

Title: Appointment of a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to NAMA
Published by: National Treasury Management Agency
Publication Date: 19/08/2009
Application Deadline:  
Notice Deadline Date: 08/09/2009
Notice Deadline Time: 16:00
Notice Type: Contract Notice
Has Documents: Yes
Abstract: On the direction of the Minister for Finance, the NTMA is seeking to appoint a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to provide valuation services (the “Services”) in respect of derivatives positions which will be transferred to NAMA. It is envisaged that one firm will be appointed to conduct the valuation of derivative positions transferring from all of the participating institutions. The Service Provider appointed will be expected to: A. Interact closely with participating institutions in order to extract key data items agreed with NAMA and required in order to carry out the valuation of derivatives. B. Determine derivatives’ valuations based on market-accepted methodologies and market rates. Valuations will incorporate adjustments which will be based on the creditworthiness of the derivatives’ counterparties and which will be specified in guidelines agreed by NAMA with the service provider.

C. The Service Provider will be required to work closely with an Audit Co-ordinator appointed by NTMA. The Audit Co-ordinator will collate valuation data and conduct audits of valuations provided by the Service Provider.

D. The Service Provider will be expected to provide a certificate to NAMA on completion of all valuations which confirms that the valuation of derivatives has been carried out on the basis of a market-accepted methodology and assumptions provided by NAMA and represents a fair assessment of the market value of such derivatives.
CPV: 66000000.

Well Boys I can save you the trouble,

There is no way in hell that anybody can put a valuation on these toxic papers /contracts .

With the collapse of the AIG the effective market no longer exists

To prove my point

When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, it triggered the transfer of large sums in the CDS market to insure buyers of Lehman credit default risk protection against all losses from that event. The sellers of these contracts received the Lehman debt and in return they were obligated to pay the contract buyers (the insured parties) enough money to make the buyers “whole” i.e. to give them their full investment in the bonds back as if they had never bought the Lehman bonds.

The auction for Lehman’s debt occurred on Friday afternoon and the final auction price was $8.62. This means that for each $100 initial par value, the debt is only worth $8.62. The sellers of Lehman CDSs (Derivative contracts) were obligated to pay the insured counterparties 91.375% of the bonds’ face value and, in return, they received the bonds.

Who had to foot the bill for Lehman CDSs (Derivative contracts) Why AIG of course!

There was a 92% loss on the stated value of the Lehman contracts and I would suspect that there in now no value on all other outstanding contracts .Why ,because there isn’t enough money printed all over the world to pay for all the contracts that have being entered into .

The perceived values of these Derivatives were based on “thrust” and not real true values!

  

What are Derivates????

Here is a short introduction I manages to find /compile for those of you that are interested in this the mother of all financial scams.

The current difficulties we are witnessing in the financial markets, is just one leg of a 3 legged stool that has come off .The next leg that is about to fall off is the Derivatives leg

and this is

Derivatives are contracts whose value is “derived” from the price of something else, typically, ‘cash market investments’ such as stocks, bonds, money market instruments or commodities.

An equity derivative, for example, might give you the right to buy a particular share at a stated price up to a given date. And in these circumstances the value of that right will be directly related to the price of the “underlying” share: if the share price moves up, then the right to buy at a fixed price becomes more valuable; if it moves down, the right to buy at a fixed price becomes less valuable.

1.

This is but one example of a particular kind of derivative contract. However, the close relationship between the value of a derivative contract and the value of the underlying asset is a common feature of all derivatives.

There are many different types of derivative contract, based on lot of different financial instruments; share prices, foreign exchange, interest rates, the difference between two different prices, or even derivatives of derivatives. The possible combinations of products are almost limitless. What then are derivatives used for?

Derivatives have two main uses: hedging and trading.

Suppose you have a position in a cash market which you want to maintain for whatever reason – it may be difficult to sell, or perhaps it forms part of your long term portfolio. However, you anticipate an adverse movement in its price. With a derivatives hedge it is possible to protect these assets from the fall in value you fear. Let’s see how.

As we have already said, the value of a derivative contract is related to the value of the underlying asset it relates to. Because of this, with derivatives, it is possible to establish a position (with the same exposure in terms of the value of the contract), which will fluctuate in value almost in parallel with an equivalent underlying position.

It is also possible with derivative contracts to go either long or short; in other words you can take an opposite position to the position you have in a particular underlying asset (or portfolio).

Hedging involves taking a temporary position in a derivatives contract(s), which is equal and opposite to your cash market position in order to protect the cash position against loss due to price fluctuations. As the price moves, loss is made on the underlying, whilst profit is made on the derivative position, the two canceling each other out.

Protecting assets which you hold from a fall in value by selling an equivalent number of derivative contracts, is known as a short hedge.

 2.

A long hedge, on the other hand, involves buying derivatives as a temporary substitute for buying the underlying at some future point. This is to lock in a buying price. In other words, you are protecting yourself against an increase in the underlying price between now and when you buy in the future.

Cash and derivatives markets move together more or less in parallel, but not always at the same time, or to the same extent. This introduces a certain amount of what is called hedge inefficiency, which may need to be adjusted. At other times, an imperfect hedge might be knowingly established, which leaves a small exposure to the underlying market depending on the risk appetite of the individual.

Trading

Derivatives trading, as opposed to hedging, means buying and selling a derivatives instrument in its own right, without, that is, a transaction in the underlying. For instance, a trader can get exposure to the US government bond market by buying and selling US government bond futures without ever dealing in the actual bonds themselves.

The aim when trading derivative contracts is profit, not protection.

The risks associated with derivatives are very different to those incurred in the cash markets. When buying a share for example – a long position – your maximum possible loss is the amount you originally paid for it.

Derivatives, on the other hand, exhibit a lot of different risk profiles. Some provide limited risk and unlimited upside potential.

For example, the risk of loss with a derivative contract which confers a right to buy a particular asset at a particular price is limited to the amount you have paid to hold that right. However, profit potential is unlimited.

Others display risk characteristics in which while your potential gain is limited, your losses are potentially unlimited. 

For example, if you sell a derivative contract which confers the right to buy a particular asset at a particular price, your profit is limited to the amount you receive for conferring that right, but, because you have to deliver that asset to the counterpart at expiry of the contract, your potential loss is unlimited.

Because of the wide range of risk profiles which derivative contracts exhibit, it is vital that you have a clear understanding of the risk/return characteristics of any derivative strategy before you execute it.

Leverage

Apart from the structure of the instrument itself, the source of a lot of the risk associated with derivative contracts stems from the fact that they are leveraged contracts.

Derivative products are said to be ‘leveraged’ because only a proportion of their total market exposure needs to be paid to open and maintain a position. This percentage of the total is called a ‘margin’ in futures markets; and a ‘premium’ in options markets. In this context, ‘leverage’ is the word used in all English-speaking derivative markets.

Because of leverage your market exposure with derivative contracts can be several times the cash you have placed on deposit as “margin” for the trade, or paid in the form of a premium.

Leverage, of course, can work both in your favor and against you. A derivative which gives you a market exposure of 10 times the funds placed on deposit is excellent if prices are moving in your favor, but not so good if they are moving against you, as losses will mount up very rapidly.

 3.

In other words, with leveraged positions, losses are magnified as well as gains.

Follow link to see advertisement

http://www.e-tenders.gov.ie/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=AUG125404

What is the Bond Market??

 Bond marke

From Wikipedia,

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

The bond market (also known as the debt, credit, or fixed income market) is a financial market where participants buy and sell debt securities, usually in the form of bonds. As of 2006, the size of the international bond market is an estimated $45 trillion, of which the size of the outstanding U.S. bond market debt was $25.2 trillion.

Nearly all of the $923 billion average daily trading volume (as of early 2007) in the U.S. bond market takes place between broker-dealers and large institutions in a decentralized, over-the-counter (OTC) market. However, a small number of bonds, primarily corporate, are listed on exchanges.

References to the “bond market” usually refer to the government bond market, because of its size, liquidity, lack of credit risk and, therefore, sensitivity to interest rates. Because of the inverse relationship between bond valuation and interest rates, the bond market is often used to indicate changes in interest rates or the shape of the yield curve.

 

Market structure

Bond markets in most countries remain decentralized and lack common exchanges like stock, future and commodity markets. This has occurred, in part, because no two bond issues are exactly alike, and the number of different securities outstanding is far larger.

However, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest centralized bond market, representing mostly corporate bonds. The NYSE migrated from the Automated Bond System (ABS) to the NYSE Bonds trading system in April 2007 and expects the number of traded issues to increase from 1000 to 6000.[1]

 Types of bond markets

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association classifies the broader bond market into five specific bond markets.

Bond market participants

Bond market participants are similar to participants in most financial markets and are essentially either buyers (debt issuer) of funds or sellers (institution) of funds and often both.

Participants include:

Because of the specificity of individual bond issues, and the lack of liquidity in many smaller issues, the majority of outstanding bonds are held by institutions like pension funds, banks and mutual funds. In the United States, approximately 10% of the market is currently held by private individuals.

Bond market volatility

For market participants who own a bond, collect the coupon and hold it to maturity, market volatility is irrelevant; principal and interest are received according to a pre-determined schedule.

But participants who buy and sell bonds before maturity are exposed to many risks, most importantly changes in interest rates. When interest rates increase, the value of existing bonds fall, since new issues pay a higher yield. Likewise, when interest rates decrease, the value of existing bonds rise, since new issues pay a lower yield. This is the fundamental concept of bond market volatility: changes in bond prices are inverse to changes in interest rates. Fluctuating interest rates are part of a country’s monetary policy and bond market volatility is a response to expected monetary policy and economic changes.

Economists’ views of economic indicators versus actual released data contribute to market volatility. A tight consensus is generally reflected in bond prices and there is little price movement in the market after the release of “in-line” data. If the economic release differs from the consensus view the market usually undergoes rapid price movement as participants interpret the data. Uncertainty (as measured by a wide consensus) generally brings more volatility before and after an economic release. Economic releases vary in importance and impact depending on where the economy is in the business cycle.

Bond investments

Investment companies allow individual investors the ability to participate in the bond markets through bond funds, closed-end funds and unit-investment trusts. In 2006 total bond fund net inflows increased 97% from $30.8 billion in 2005 to $60.8 billion in 2006.[2] Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are another alternative to trading or investing directly in a bond issue. These securities allow individual investors the ability to overcome large initial and incremental trading sizes.

Bond indices

Main article: Bond market index

A number of bond indices exist for the purposes of managing portfolios and measuring performance, similar to the S&P 500 or Russell Indexes for stocks. The most common American benchmarks are the Lehman Aggregate, Citigroup BIG and Merrill Lynch Domestic Master. Most indices are parts of families of broader indices that can be used to measure global bond portfolios, or may be further subdivided by maturity and/or sector for managing specialized portfol

Bond market
   
Bond · Debenture · Fixed income
   
Types of bonds by issuer Agency bond · Corporate bond (Senior debt, Subordinated debt) · Distressed debt · Emerging market debt · Government bond · Municipal bond · Sovereign bond
   
Types of bonds by payout Accrual bond · Auction rate security · Callable bond · Commercial paper · Convertible bond · Exchangeable bond · Fixed rate bond · Floating rate note · High-yield debt · Inflation-indexed bond · Inverse floating rate note · Perpetual bond · Puttable bond · Reverse convertible · Zero-coupon bond
   
Securitized Products Asset-backed security · Collateralized debt obligation · Collateralized mortgage obligation · Commercial mortgage-backed security · Mortgage-backed security
   
Derivatives Bond option · Credit derivative · Credit default swap · CLN
   
Pricing Accrued interest · Bond valuation · Clean price · Coupon · Day count convention · Dirty price · Maturity · Par value
   
Yield analysis Nominal yield · Current yield · Yield to maturity · Yield curve · Bond duration  · Bond convexity  · TED spread
   
Credit and spread analysis Credit analysis · Credit risk · Credit spread · Yield spread · Z-spread · Option adjusted spread
   
Interest rate models Short rate models · Rendleman-Bartter · Vasicek · Ho-Lee · Hull-White · Cox-Ingersoll-Ross · Chen · Heath-Jarrow-Morton · Black-Derman-Toy · Brace-Gatarek-Musiela
   
Organizations Commercial Mortgage Securities Association (CMSA) · International Capital Market Association (ICMA) · Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)

Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_market

     See also Link

(http://www.investinginbonds.com/)

Tag Cloud