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Debt Burden Falls Heavily on Germany and France

By JACK EWING

FRANKFURT — French and German banks have lent nearly $1 trillion to the most troubled European countries and are more exposed to the debt crisis than the banks of any other countries, according to a new report that is likely to add pressure on institutions to detail their holdings.

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Ronald Zak/Associated Press

Jean-Claude Trichet, left, president of the European Central Bank, with Josef Ackermann of Deutsche Bank.

French banks had lent $493 billion to Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland by the end of 2009 while German banks had lent $465 billion, according to the report by the Bank for International Settlements, an institution based in Basel, Switzerland, that acts as a clearing house for the world’s central banks.

The report sheds light on where the risks from Spain and other troubled euro-zone countries are concentrated, but left open the question of which individual banks would be most endangered by declines in the prices of sovereign bonds or a surge in bad loans made to companies and individuals. The B.I.S. did not identify individual institutions, in line with its confidentiality rules.

Voluntary disclosure by banks has been uneven. Hypo Real Estate Holding, a real estate and public-sector lender based near Munich, has put its exposure to government debt from the four countries plus Italy at more than €80 billion, or $97 billion. Deutsche Bank, in Frankfurt, says it holds €500 million in Greek government bonds and no Spanish or Portuguese sovereign debt.

But there has been little disclosure from the hundreds of smaller mortgage lenders, state-owned banks and savings banks that dominate banking in countries like Germany and Spain.

“More information and disclosure on bank and financial institutions’ holdings of periphery paper would be beneficial,” Jacques Cailloux, an economist at Royal Bank of Scotland, said Sunday. Mr. Cailloux had not seen the report — which was released to news organizations on the condition that they not publish the findings until late Sunday — but he was one of the authors of a Royal Bank of Scotland study in May that anticipated many of the B.I.S. findings.

All told, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece owe nearly $1.6 trillion to banks in the 16-country euro zone, either in the form of government debt or credit to companies and individuals in the four countries, the report said. Credit from French and German banks accounted for 61 percent of that total.

Uncertainty about which banks may be at risk from Greece and the other countries has fed mistrust among financial institutions, causing interbank lending to wither and leading European Union leaders to take extraordinary steps to prevent a financial collapse.

The European Central Bank has been pressuring E.U. regulators to release data on which banks may be most at risk, to separate the healthy banks from those that may be in trouble.

“We are encouraging them to do whatever is necessary to improve the sentiment of the market because that is the real issue today,” the E.C.B. president, Jean-Claude Trichet, said at a news conference last week.

Mr. Cailloux said that releasing the results of so-called stress tests, which examine banks’ ability to withstand market shocks, would be useful if the tests were based on realistic possibilities and there were measures in place to bolster the banks that prove vulnerable.

The lack of information about which banks could suffer most from Europe’s debt crisis led to the near-seizure of money markets in early May. That, along with plunging prices for sovereign bonds from the weakest countries, prompted the European Union and the International Monetary Fund to pledge nearly $1 trillion in debt guarantees for euro-zone governments.

The European Central Bank also took the unprecedented step of buying European government bonds in the open markets, where trading had nearly come to a halt.

“There is mounting evidence that the blind don’t want to lend to the blind,” Ed Yardeni, president of Yardeni Research, wrote in a research note last week.

The B.I.S. figures confirm estimates of the level of risk by analysts at Royal Bank of Scotland and others, which had been extrapolated from B.I.S. data and other sources. But the B.I.S. report provides more detail on country-by-country exposure, and the organization’s imprimatur means it will be difficult for critics to dismiss the information as exaggerated.

Most of the claims held by the French and German banks were from companies, individuals or other banks, and Spain was the biggest debtor country. But much of the holdings were government debt — $106 billion for French banks and $68 billion for German banks. The figures, which the B.I.S. presented in dollars, may offer a clue why the French government, in particular, has been keen to provide aid to Greece and the other troubled countries.

Private-sector debt from Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland has also become a concern, because government austerity programs and economic downturns in those countries may also take a toll on the ability of companies and individuals to repay loans, and lead to a surge in defaults.

The risk from the so-called peripheral countries is by no means limited to France and Germany. British banks have lent $230 billion to Ireland, while Spain — besides being one of the countries with a debt problem — has lent $110 billion to residents of Portugal.

The B.I.S. put total exposure by U.S. institutions to Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland at less than $200 billion.

source http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/business/global/14eurobank.html?ref=jack_ewing

Pirates Of The ‘Carry-On-Regardless’

Posted by jayfromeire on Mar 25th, 2010 and filed under Economic Crisis, International. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0. You can leave a response or trackback to this entry from your site


William K. Black wrote a book in 2005 titled “The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One” where he outlined the fraud and corruption at the highest levels of international banking.                   

What we are seeing now in the light of massive bonuses, involving billions of Euro, Dollars and Pounds, being handed out to executives and lower level employees, is simply the same culture of fraud and corruption which has seeped down to the lower levels of an industry which has utterly disregarded any pretence of moral conscience.       

           
 

This industry has deliberately plunged the world and the majority of ordinary people into a period of extreme doubts and anxieties over the future of themselves, their children and future generations.        

The climate of greed in this industry has undeniably never changed. Whilst the international bankers have absconded with the wealth of nations, their cronies in subsidiary banks, where ordinary people’s financial security is crucial, are now doing the same. These lower level parasites continue to coerce governments into passing legislation, in Ireland’s case, NAMA – (Never Any Money Again).                   

This is happening across the developed world and allows governments, without the consent of its citizens, to literally tax working people to pay for the illegal and corrupt practices of a criminal cabal responsible for the state of the world today.                    

This is piracy of the highest order, and the ordinary people paying for this, for generations to come, will be born into a financial bondage to the coming world state which amounts to nothing less than SLAVERY.               

We are being financially raped by the banking elite who simply demand that our government pass the very legislation which will condemn the citizens to a future of indentured servitude. We, the taxpayers, will have to cough up our last cent to the parasites of finance to furnish their lavish lifestyles of champagne parties and fancy yachts, whilst we are left struggling to make ends meet.                 

The government tells us we need to get through this current financial crisis together, by pulling together don’t you know, whilst they maintain their positions of power over us and live the highlife with their banker and building developer buddies. They don’t take responsibility for, or account to the public for, the catastrophe they’ve inflicted on families and businesses in this country. At the same time they try to justify their uselessness and inflated salaries, presumably in line with their inflated egos and ludicrous self belief in their value to society, whilst at the same time maintaining their massive expense accounts and lavish pension arrangements which nobody else in the country is entitled to.

machholz responce 

Careful what you ask for!

With the cries of change the government getting louder, I caution and ask the question will we be any better off?

Make no mistake I want to have a change of government and I want to jail All the corrupt Basta***

Responsible for the mess we are now in.

What exactly will the new government do about the political gangsters responsible for the mess we are now in?

see posting

Reckless expectations, not competition

 

This is a lengthy post – to reflect the importance of the issue at hand. And it is based largely on data from Professor Brian Lucey, with my added analysis .

The proposition that this post is proving is the following one:

Far from being harmed by competition from foreign lenders, Irish banking sector has suffered from its own disease of reckless lending. In fact, competition in Irish banking remains remarkably close (although below) European average and is acting as a stabilizing force in the markets relative to other factors.

I always found the argument that ‘too much competition in banking was the driver of excessive lending’ to be an economically illiterate one. Even though this view has been professed by some of my most esteemed colleagues in economics.

In theory, competition acts to lower margins in the sector, and since it takes time to build up competitive pressure, the sectors that are facing competition are characterized by stable, established players. In other words, in most cases, sectors with a lot of competition are older, mature ones. This fact is even more pronounced if entry into the sector is associated with significant capital cost requirements. Banking – in particular run of the mill, non-innovative traditional type – is the case in point everywhere in the world.

As competition drives margins down, making quick buck becomes impossible. You can’t hope to write a few high margin, high risk loans and reap huge returns. So firms in highly competitive sectors compete against each other on the basis of longer term strategies that are more stable and prudent. Deploying virtually commoditized services or products to larger numbers of population. Reputation and ever-increasing efficiencies in operations become the driving factors of every surviving firm’s success. And these promote longer term stability of the sector.

Coase’s famous proposition about transaction costs provides a basis for such a corollary.

This means that in the case of Irish banking during the last decade, if competition was indeed driving down the margins in lending (as our stockbrokers, the Government and policy analysts ardently argue today), then the following should have happened.

  1. Banks should have become more prudent over time in lending and risk pricing,
  2. There should have been broader diversification of the banks lending portfolia, with the bulk of new loans concentrating in the areas relating directly to depositor base – corporate and household lending, and a hefty fringe of higher-margin inter-mediation lending to financial institutions, and
  3. Banks would be seeking to ‘bundle’ more services to differentiate from competitors and enhance margins.

In Ireland, of course, during the alleged period of ‘harmful competition’ exactly the opposite took place. Let me use Prof Brian Lucey’s data (with added analysis from myself) to show you the facts.

Firstly, Irish banks became less prudent in lending – as exemplified by falling loans approvals criteria, and by rising LTVs:

Lending to private sector as % of GDP was ca 50% in 1995, reaching 100% in 1998 and rising to 300% in 2009Vast increases in lending to developers: in 1997 there were €10bn lent out to developers against €20bn in mortgages; in 2008 these figures were €110bn and €140bn respectivelyOver the time when lending to private sector rose 600%, mortgages lending rose 550%, our GDP rose by 75%

Secondly, banks reduced their assets and liabilities diversification (charts 1-3 below) setting themselves up for a massive rise in asymmetric risk exposures. .

On the funding side, out went customers deposits, in came banks deposits, foreign deposits and bonds and Irish bond s

Full article link http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2010/03/economics-21032010-reckless.html

articel by  Dr. Constantin Gurdgiev

Tell the people the truth about the Markets & NAMA

Do you really want to know what is really going on in the market place?
Ever heard of the “Rigged Market capitalists system”
Are you ready for this news??
Ernst & Young auditors of Anglo Irish Bank now working for NAMA ,
The same auditors for Lehman Brothers .
This is criminal , allowing this to go on, they should all be in Jail !
We must have a new Irish people’s political party that will stop this fraud in its tracks.
A political party that will prosecute all the individuals responsible for this criminal conspiracy
They must be brought to justice
We the people must have our pound of flesh!

Irish Banks Derivative trading losses

I believe that the banks Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland and Anglo Irish Bank are all hopelessly exposed to huge losses as a result of Derivative trading

They should be asked to come clean and give categorical assurances on their Derivative Trading

Apart from the huge losses on their propriety /mortgages business.ie (subprime desaster),  there is another enormous source of losses from the same banks and that is their trading in the “BOND MARKET” again I believe that they have huge exposure here as well

These Banks have lent approximately 400 billion Euros and all of it borrowed from foreign banks, these funds would have had to have  “Hedging ” or have an insurance taken out ,in case of default !

So what kind of insurance did they get then if not Derivatives?

Derivatives typically have a large notional value. As such, there is the danger that their use could result in losses that the investor would be unable to compensate for. The possibility that this could lead to a chain reaction ensuing in an economic crisis, has been pointed out by famed investor Warren Buffett in Berkshire Hathaway‘s 2002 annual report. Buffett called them ‘financial weapons of mass destruction.’ The problem with derivatives is that they control an increasingly larger notional amount of assets and this may lead to distortions in the real capital and equities markets. Investors begin to look at the derivatives markets to make a decision to buy or sell securities and so what was originally meant to be a market to transfer risk now becomes a leading indicator.

These Derivatives were traded like confetti at a wedding and have about the same value now !

 If a bank goes bust, deals are just canceled and the residual amount is transferred to the legal department. Everyone can live with that. The burden is transferred from the agent (trading floor) to the principal (the shareholders). Because risk cannot be hedged properly by market professionals, it needs to be taken over by a succession of outsiders. If outsiders are not willing to play anymore (Derivative traders) or go bust, (AIG) then risk concentrates again inside the market, where it cannot be hedged and goes Bust.

So derivatives are only as safe as their underlying  risk is liquid and delta-hedgeable.

Brian Cowen was the Finance Minister who oversaw all this gambling activity at the major Irish banks and should be made accountable for the Total Destruction of the Irish financial industry 

Brian Lenihian  is colluding with the Greens to hide the catastrophic nature of the major Banks debts! Indeed I go so far as to say they may be kept in the dark as to the combined total losses which I estimate at Anglo Irish Bank to be somewhere north of 120 Billion Euros alone!

If I am wrong, then prove me wrong, by showing us the figures of Anglo Irish Bank .

Open the books let us see for ourselves

Don’t let anyone tell you that Anglo was nor dealing in Bonds or Derivative Products,

  I call on the Minister of Finance to come out on to the Dail floor and tell the Nation that the Irish Banks have no exposure to these Derivative Markets.

 But before you do I have a question for you!

Why was there this amendment made to the NAMA Legislation?

Page 15 of the draft NAMA legislation says that the definition of a “credit facility” includes instruments such as”a hedging or derivative facility.”  Section 56, starting on page 46, then defines eligible assets for purchase by NAMA as a range of different types of “credit facilities” as well as “any other class of bank asset (Derivatives) the acquisition of which, in the opinion of the Minister, is necessary for the purposes of this Act.”

Why is the National Treasury Management Agency actively looking to recruit a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to NAMA?

And before you deny that look below!

Title: Appointment of a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to NAMA
Published by: National Treasury Management Agency
Publication Date: 19/08/2009
Application Deadline:  
Notice Deadline Date: 08/09/2009
Notice Deadline Time: 16:00
Notice Type: Contract Notice
Has Documents: Yes
Abstract: On the direction of the Minister for Finance, the NTMA is seeking to appoint a Derivatives Valuation Service Provider to provide valuation services (the “Services”) in respect of derivatives positions which will be transferred to NAMA. It is envisaged that one firm will be appointed to conduct the valuation of derivative positions transferring from all of the participating institutions. The Service Provider appointed will be expected to: A. Interact closely with participating institutions in order to extract key data items agreed with NAMA and required in order to carry out the valuation of derivatives. B. Determine derivatives’ valuations based on market-accepted methodologies and market rates. Valuations will incorporate adjustments which will be based on the creditworthiness of the derivatives’ counterparties and which will be specified in guidelines agreed by NAMA with the service provider.

C. The Service Provider will be required to work closely with an Audit Co-ordinator appointed by NTMA. The Audit Co-ordinator will collate valuation data and conduct audits of valuations provided by the Service Provider.

D. The Service Provider will be expected to provide a certificate to NAMA on completion of all valuations which confirms that the valuation of derivatives has been carried out on the basis of a market-accepted methodology and assumptions provided by NAMA and represents a fair assessment of the market value of such derivatives.
CPV: 66000000.

Well Boys I can save you the trouble,

There is no way in hell that anybody can put a valuation on these toxic papers /contracts .

With the collapse of the AIG the effective market no longer exists

To prove my point

When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, it triggered the transfer of large sums in the CDS market to insure buyers of Lehman credit default risk protection against all losses from that event. The sellers of these contracts received the Lehman debt and in return they were obligated to pay the contract buyers (the insured parties) enough money to make the buyers “whole” i.e. to give them their full investment in the bonds back as if they had never bought the Lehman bonds.

The auction for Lehman’s debt occurred on Friday afternoon and the final auction price was $8.62. This means that for each $100 initial par value, the debt is only worth $8.62. The sellers of Lehman CDSs (Derivative contracts) were obligated to pay the insured counterparties 91.375% of the bonds’ face value and, in return, they received the bonds.

Who had to foot the bill for Lehman CDSs (Derivative contracts) Why AIG of course!

There was a 92% loss on the stated value of the Lehman contracts and I would suspect that there in now no value on all other outstanding contracts .Why ,because there isn’t enough money printed all over the world to pay for all the contracts that have being entered into .

The perceived values of these Derivatives were based on “thrust” and not real true values!

  

What are Derivates????

Here is a short introduction I manages to find /compile for those of you that are interested in this the mother of all financial scams.

The current difficulties we are witnessing in the financial markets, is just one leg of a 3 legged stool that has come off .The next leg that is about to fall off is the Derivatives leg

and this is

Derivatives are contracts whose value is “derived” from the price of something else, typically, ‘cash market investments’ such as stocks, bonds, money market instruments or commodities.

An equity derivative, for example, might give you the right to buy a particular share at a stated price up to a given date. And in these circumstances the value of that right will be directly related to the price of the “underlying” share: if the share price moves up, then the right to buy at a fixed price becomes more valuable; if it moves down, the right to buy at a fixed price becomes less valuable.

1.

This is but one example of a particular kind of derivative contract. However, the close relationship between the value of a derivative contract and the value of the underlying asset is a common feature of all derivatives.

There are many different types of derivative contract, based on lot of different financial instruments; share prices, foreign exchange, interest rates, the difference between two different prices, or even derivatives of derivatives. The possible combinations of products are almost limitless. What then are derivatives used for?

Derivatives have two main uses: hedging and trading.

Suppose you have a position in a cash market which you want to maintain for whatever reason – it may be difficult to sell, or perhaps it forms part of your long term portfolio. However, you anticipate an adverse movement in its price. With a derivatives hedge it is possible to protect these assets from the fall in value you fear. Let’s see how.

As we have already said, the value of a derivative contract is related to the value of the underlying asset it relates to. Because of this, with derivatives, it is possible to establish a position (with the same exposure in terms of the value of the contract), which will fluctuate in value almost in parallel with an equivalent underlying position.

It is also possible with derivative contracts to go either long or short; in other words you can take an opposite position to the position you have in a particular underlying asset (or portfolio).

Hedging involves taking a temporary position in a derivatives contract(s), which is equal and opposite to your cash market position in order to protect the cash position against loss due to price fluctuations. As the price moves, loss is made on the underlying, whilst profit is made on the derivative position, the two canceling each other out.

Protecting assets which you hold from a fall in value by selling an equivalent number of derivative contracts, is known as a short hedge.

 2.

A long hedge, on the other hand, involves buying derivatives as a temporary substitute for buying the underlying at some future point. This is to lock in a buying price. In other words, you are protecting yourself against an increase in the underlying price between now and when you buy in the future.

Cash and derivatives markets move together more or less in parallel, but not always at the same time, or to the same extent. This introduces a certain amount of what is called hedge inefficiency, which may need to be adjusted. At other times, an imperfect hedge might be knowingly established, which leaves a small exposure to the underlying market depending on the risk appetite of the individual.

Trading

Derivatives trading, as opposed to hedging, means buying and selling a derivatives instrument in its own right, without, that is, a transaction in the underlying. For instance, a trader can get exposure to the US government bond market by buying and selling US government bond futures without ever dealing in the actual bonds themselves.

The aim when trading derivative contracts is profit, not protection.

The risks associated with derivatives are very different to those incurred in the cash markets. When buying a share for example – a long position – your maximum possible loss is the amount you originally paid for it.

Derivatives, on the other hand, exhibit a lot of different risk profiles. Some provide limited risk and unlimited upside potential.

For example, the risk of loss with a derivative contract which confers a right to buy a particular asset at a particular price is limited to the amount you have paid to hold that right. However, profit potential is unlimited.

Others display risk characteristics in which while your potential gain is limited, your losses are potentially unlimited. 

For example, if you sell a derivative contract which confers the right to buy a particular asset at a particular price, your profit is limited to the amount you receive for conferring that right, but, because you have to deliver that asset to the counterpart at expiry of the contract, your potential loss is unlimited.

Because of the wide range of risk profiles which derivative contracts exhibit, it is vital that you have a clear understanding of the risk/return characteristics of any derivative strategy before you execute it.

Leverage

Apart from the structure of the instrument itself, the source of a lot of the risk associated with derivative contracts stems from the fact that they are leveraged contracts.

Derivative products are said to be ‘leveraged’ because only a proportion of their total market exposure needs to be paid to open and maintain a position. This percentage of the total is called a ‘margin’ in futures markets; and a ‘premium’ in options markets. In this context, ‘leverage’ is the word used in all English-speaking derivative markets.

Because of leverage your market exposure with derivative contracts can be several times the cash you have placed on deposit as “margin” for the trade, or paid in the form of a premium.

Leverage, of course, can work both in your favor and against you. A derivative which gives you a market exposure of 10 times the funds placed on deposit is excellent if prices are moving in your favor, but not so good if they are moving against you, as losses will mount up very rapidly.

 3.

In other words, with leveraged positions, losses are magnified as well as gains.

Follow link to see advertisement

http://www.e-tenders.gov.ie/search/show/search_view.aspx?ID=AUG125404

What is the Bond Market??

 Bond marke

From Wikipedia,

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

The bond market (also known as the debt, credit, or fixed income market) is a financial market where participants buy and sell debt securities, usually in the form of bonds. As of 2006, the size of the international bond market is an estimated $45 trillion, of which the size of the outstanding U.S. bond market debt was $25.2 trillion.

Nearly all of the $923 billion average daily trading volume (as of early 2007) in the U.S. bond market takes place between broker-dealers and large institutions in a decentralized, over-the-counter (OTC) market. However, a small number of bonds, primarily corporate, are listed on exchanges.

References to the “bond market” usually refer to the government bond market, because of its size, liquidity, lack of credit risk and, therefore, sensitivity to interest rates. Because of the inverse relationship between bond valuation and interest rates, the bond market is often used to indicate changes in interest rates or the shape of the yield curve.

 

Market structure

Bond markets in most countries remain decentralized and lack common exchanges like stock, future and commodity markets. This has occurred, in part, because no two bond issues are exactly alike, and the number of different securities outstanding is far larger.

However, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest centralized bond market, representing mostly corporate bonds. The NYSE migrated from the Automated Bond System (ABS) to the NYSE Bonds trading system in April 2007 and expects the number of traded issues to increase from 1000 to 6000.[1]

 Types of bond markets

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association classifies the broader bond market into five specific bond markets.

Bond market participants

Bond market participants are similar to participants in most financial markets and are essentially either buyers (debt issuer) of funds or sellers (institution) of funds and often both.

Participants include:

Because of the specificity of individual bond issues, and the lack of liquidity in many smaller issues, the majority of outstanding bonds are held by institutions like pension funds, banks and mutual funds. In the United States, approximately 10% of the market is currently held by private individuals.

Bond market volatility

For market participants who own a bond, collect the coupon and hold it to maturity, market volatility is irrelevant; principal and interest are received according to a pre-determined schedule.

But participants who buy and sell bonds before maturity are exposed to many risks, most importantly changes in interest rates. When interest rates increase, the value of existing bonds fall, since new issues pay a higher yield. Likewise, when interest rates decrease, the value of existing bonds rise, since new issues pay a lower yield. This is the fundamental concept of bond market volatility: changes in bond prices are inverse to changes in interest rates. Fluctuating interest rates are part of a country’s monetary policy and bond market volatility is a response to expected monetary policy and economic changes.

Economists’ views of economic indicators versus actual released data contribute to market volatility. A tight consensus is generally reflected in bond prices and there is little price movement in the market after the release of “in-line” data. If the economic release differs from the consensus view the market usually undergoes rapid price movement as participants interpret the data. Uncertainty (as measured by a wide consensus) generally brings more volatility before and after an economic release. Economic releases vary in importance and impact depending on where the economy is in the business cycle.

Bond investments

Investment companies allow individual investors the ability to participate in the bond markets through bond funds, closed-end funds and unit-investment trusts. In 2006 total bond fund net inflows increased 97% from $30.8 billion in 2005 to $60.8 billion in 2006.[2] Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are another alternative to trading or investing directly in a bond issue. These securities allow individual investors the ability to overcome large initial and incremental trading sizes.

Bond indices

Main article: Bond market index

A number of bond indices exist for the purposes of managing portfolios and measuring performance, similar to the S&P 500 or Russell Indexes for stocks. The most common American benchmarks are the Lehman Aggregate, Citigroup BIG and Merrill Lynch Domestic Master. Most indices are parts of families of broader indices that can be used to measure global bond portfolios, or may be further subdivided by maturity and/or sector for managing specialized portfol

Bond market
   
Bond · Debenture · Fixed income
   
Types of bonds by issuer Agency bond · Corporate bond (Senior debt, Subordinated debt) · Distressed debt · Emerging market debt · Government bond · Municipal bond · Sovereign bond
   
Types of bonds by payout Accrual bond · Auction rate security · Callable bond · Commercial paper · Convertible bond · Exchangeable bond · Fixed rate bond · Floating rate note · High-yield debt · Inflation-indexed bond · Inverse floating rate note · Perpetual bond · Puttable bond · Reverse convertible · Zero-coupon bond
   
Securitized Products Asset-backed security · Collateralized debt obligation · Collateralized mortgage obligation · Commercial mortgage-backed security · Mortgage-backed security
   
Derivatives Bond option · Credit derivative · Credit default swap · CLN
   
Pricing Accrued interest · Bond valuation · Clean price · Coupon · Day count convention · Dirty price · Maturity · Par value
   
Yield analysis Nominal yield · Current yield · Yield to maturity · Yield curve · Bond duration  · Bond convexity  · TED spread
   
Credit and spread analysis Credit analysis · Credit risk · Credit spread · Yield spread · Z-spread · Option adjusted spread
   
Interest rate models Short rate models · Rendleman-Bartter · Vasicek · Ho-Lee · Hull-White · Cox-Ingersoll-Ross · Chen · Heath-Jarrow-Morton · Black-Derman-Toy · Brace-Gatarek-Musiela
   
Organizations Commercial Mortgage Securities Association (CMSA) · International Capital Market Association (ICMA) · Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)

Retrieved from “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bond_market

     See also Link

(http://www.investinginbonds.com/)

The Derivatives bubble

 

 


 

Derivatives have grew into a massive bubble, some USD
1,144 Trillion
by 2007. The new derivatives bubble was fuelled by five key economic and political trends:

  1. Sarbanes-Oxley increased corporate disclosures and government oversight
  2. Federal Reserve’s cheap money policies created the subprime-housing boom
  3. War budgets burdened the U.S. Treasury and future entitlements programs
  4. Trade deficits with China and others destroyed the value of the U.S. dollar
  5. Oil and commodity rich nations demanding equity payments rather than debt

In short, despite Buffett’s clear warnings,”
in my view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”

That warning was in Buffett’s 2002 letter to Berkshire shareholders. He saw a future that many others chose to ignore. On Buffett’s mind also was His acquisition of General Re four years earlier, about the time the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund almost killed the global monetary system. How? This is crucial: LTCM nearly killed the system with a relatively small $5 billion trading loss. Peanuts compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars of subprime-credit write-offs now making Wall Street’s big shots look like amateurs. Buffett tried to sell off Gen Re’s derivatives group. No buyers. Unwinding it was costly, but led to his warning that derivatives are a “financial weapon of mass destruction.”


A massive new derivatives bubble is driving the domestic and global economies, a bubble that continues growing today parallel with the subprime-credit meltdown triggering a bear-recession. In five years comes from the most recent survey by the Bank of International Settlements, the world’s clearinghouse for central banks in Basel, Switzerland. The BIS is like the cashier’s window at a racetrack or casino, where you’d place a bet or cash in chips, except on a massive scale: BIS is where the U.S. settles trade imbalances with Saudi Arabia for all that oil we guzzle and gives China IOUs for the tainted drugs and lead-based toys we buy.

To grasp how significant this bubble is let’s look at these numbers

U.S. annual gross domestic product is about $15 trillion

  • U.S. money supply is also about $15 trillion
  • Current proposed U.S. federal budget is $3 trillion
    • U.S. government’s maximum legal debt is $9 trillion
    • U.S. mutual fund companies manage about $12 trillion
    • World’s GDPs for all nations is approximately $50 trillion
    • Unfunded Social Security and Medicare benefits $50 trillion to $65 trillion
    • Total value of the world’s real estate is estimated at about $75 trillion
    • Total value of world’s stock and bond markets is more than $100 trillion
    • BIS valuation of world’s derivatives back in 2002 was about $100 trillion
    • BIS 2007 valuation of the world’s derivatives is now a whopping $516 trillion

Moreover, the folks at http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm
BIS tell me their estimate of $516 trillion only includes “transactions in which a major private dealer (bank) is involved on at least one side of the transaction,” but doesn’t include private deals between two “non-reporting entities.” They did, however, add that their reporting central banks estimate that the coverage of the survey is around 95% on average.

Also, keep in mind that while the $516Trillion “notional” value (maximum in case of a meltdown) of the deals is a good measure of the market’s size, the 2007 BIS study notes that the $11 trillion “gross market values provides a more accurate measure of the scale of financial risk transfer taking place in derivatives markets.”


The fact is, derivatives have become the world’s biggest “black market,” exceeding the illicit traffic in stuff like arms, drugs, alcohol, gambling, cigarettes, stolen art and pirated movies. Why? Because like all black markets, derivatives are a perfect way of getting rich while avoiding taxes and government regulations. And in today’s slowdown, plus a volatile global market, Wall Street knows derivatives remain a lucrative business.

Recently Pimco’s bond fund king Bill Gross said “What we are witnessing is essentially the breakdown of our modern-day banking system, a complex of leveraged lending so hard to understand that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke required a face-to-face refresher course from hedge fund managers in mid-August.” In short, not only Warren Buffett, but Bond King Bill Gross, our Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, the Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the rest of America’s leaders can’t “figure out” the world’s USD .1,144 Trillion $ derivatives.(see below)

BIS is primarily a records-keeper, a toothless tiger that merely collects data giving a legitimacy and false sense of security to this chaotic “shadow banking system” that has become the world’s biggest “black market?”

Here are some of the types of derivatives that are out there.

Have you ever heard of them?

Chances are your local bank manager hasn’t either!

But I bet his Head office has a few slick traders that are trading these on a Daly bases and I’m

Pretty sure that they must be in it up to their necks!

  • Foreign exchange contracts
  • Listed credit derivatives
  • OTC ( over the counter)
  • Forwards and forex swaps
  •  Currency swaps
  • Options on Interest rate contracts
  • Forward rate agreements
  • Interest rate swaps
  • Options on
    Equity-linked contracts
  • Forwards and swaps
  • Options on Gold & Other commodities
  • Credit default swaps
  • Single-name instruments
  • Multi-name instruments
  • Unallocated instruments
  • CDS (credit default swaps)
    CDSs are derivatives whose cost is determined using financial models and by arbitrage relationships with other credit market instruments such as loans and bonds from the same ‘Reference Entity’ to which the CDS contract refers

     

  • ABS (asset-backed securities)
  • MBS (mortgage-backed securities)
  • OTC derivatives
  • Futures

    To name but a few!

  •  According to various distinguished sources including the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland — the central bankers’ bank — the amount of outstanding derivatives worldwide as of December 2007 crossed USD 1.144 Quadrillion, ie, USD 1,144 Trillion. The main categories of the USD 1.144 Quadrillion derivatives market were the following:

  • 1. Listed credit derivatives stood at USD 548 trillion;

    2. The Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives stood in notional or face value at USD 596 trillion and included:

    a. Interest Rate Derivatives at about USD 393+ trillion;

    b. Credit Default Swaps at about USD 58+ trillion;

    c. Foreign Exchange Derivatives at about USD 56+ trillion;

    d. Commodity Derivatives at about USD 9 trillion;

    e. Equity Linked Derivatives at about USD 8.5 trillion; and

    f. Unallocated Derivatives at about USD 71+ trillion.

 

For a more indebt information on the latest actual derivative figures please follow this link

It makes very interesting reading

Link  http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm

Source http://www.elliottwavetechnology.com

Tom Foremski at http://www.siliconvalleywatcher.com/mt/archives/2008/10/the_size_of_der.php

The Firing of the New Central Bank Governor

The Firing of the New Central Bank Governor

The calling by the new central bank governor Mr. Paddy Honohan for a “nine eleven type commission investigation into the banking crisis” is totally unforgiveable and accordingly he should immediately stand down. His position is supposed to be politically neutral. This act by the governor is a sign as to how desperate the Central Bank’s position has become. As everyone knows the best form of defence is attack. If his ploy does not work he is finished.

Every astute financier knows that the responsibility for the disaster lies squarely in the court of the Central Bank. Their man ran the Financial Services Regulatory Authority. They allowed the Irish banks use the “originate to distribute” mortgage model (see article below: Note 1). They allowed Irish financial institutions to operate with no regard to realistic underlying property valuations. They allowed intra-banking loans, sometimes in the billions, to shift between golden directors without disclosure. This same “regulator” fines and closes down poor struggling insurance brokers, mortgage brokers and financial advisors for minor regulatory oversights. Mr. Honohan, a World Bank and Trinity College insider knows this and is thus no stranger to cynical hypocrisy.

However, not everybody knows that the Irish Central Bank, now part of the European Central Bank, is a privately owned franchise. The appointment of the Governor is “independent” of our Parliament. The process seems democratic but this PR stunt is a ruse. The Central Bank is beyond our National control under the present arrangement. This state of affairs should not be allowed continue. The World banking franchise, of which Ireland is a small branch, is also privately owned and is based in Switzerland. The Global brand of this private corporation is called the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). It was to BIS that Alan Greenspan was flying when the Twin Towers were hit on 11th. September 2001. Is this why, ironically, Honohan is calling for a 911 type enquiry?

A sovereign people have the natural right to issue sovereign currency and sovereign, interest free, credit. Argentina solved its “debt crisis” by walking away from its dollar debt obligations to Uncle Sam’s banks. This action destroyed private dollar institutional assets but saved a Nation and a people from ruin. It took great courage. Is it time the Irish government realised such courage and understood their true power options?

Paddy Honohan and his gang should be shown the door for a start. Control of the Central Bank and its regulatory responsibilities should be made sovereign again as it was in 1922 under the new Irish Republic. The people who caused the disaster cannot be trusted to steer the Nation towards a fair and equitable resolution. All should be changed, changed utterly.

Note 1.     (Published Article from the Internet, May 2009).

The “Sub-Prime” Crisis Understood:

The “Originate to Distribute” Basle

Banking Model Created the Banking Crisis

 

In an attempt to comprehend the current “credit crisis” I decided to try to investigate its underlying causes. To my dismay I discovered that the situation did not come about by accident but was actually conceived and planned by the International Banking Fraternity in Basel, Switzerland, in 1998.

The tsunami of credit that burst onto the scene after this “Basle Accord” helped save America from a 2001 recession, enabled it to fund a war, sleep walked Europeans, politically, into the Euro Zone and attempted to copper fasten the artificial state called the European Union. This crisis is no accident it was premeditated and internationally agreed.

If you don’t believe the pre-meditation involved please read the quote below from the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27th. 2007:

“In 1998 the Basle Accord created the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage whereby banks could shift loans off their balance sheets. A new capital discipline that was designed to “improve” risk management led to a PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM whose lack of transparency explains how the market started to seize up.

The “originate-to-distribute” model REDUCED THE INCENTIVE for banks to monitor the CREDIT QUALITY of the loans they pumped into collateralized-

loan-obligations and other structured vehicles, the rules failed to highlight contingent
credit risk……With Basle II, the question is just how the markets will evolve over the next 20 years…. as the new accord will require banks to hold LESS CAPITAL”.

American history has shown that many of its great leaders saw the danger in granting banking institutions too much power over the destiny of a nation. The Basle I Accord and now Basle II indicate just how fundamentally the International Banking Groups have lost their moral compass and altered old standard banking rules. Through sleight of hand i.e. “off balance sheet accounting” they allowed the financial structure of the world to become totally unstable and risk prone. If one was cynical one would actually come to believe that in 1998 future failure was built into the matrix; failure which only the strongest and the most astute could survive.

The end result will be systematic institutional deflation on a worldwide basis. Even though cash is being pumped into the major institutions the multiples of “off balance sheet” credit are now historic, thus the corporate inflation has already occurred. What we will now experience going forward is dept collapse and with it falling mortgage issuance and restrictive commercial funding. Here in Ireland business activity has almost come to a standstill and everybody is holding their breath wondering what the next crisis will be. The only saving grace is that things are not much better in Italy, Germany, France or Spain and is actually much worse in Scotland, (where the bank of Scotland failed) England and Greece. This crisis is truly global.

As institutional deflation (due to collapsing systematic credit) and social inflation (due to the panic demand and circulation of currency) spreads around the globe those who are left holding excess negotiable resources will be in a very powerful position to soak up value assets for pennies on the dollar. Regular folk will not be able to participate in this bonanza because for them the banking credit system will be closed with nothing to offer but foreclosure and frustration. The majority will in a defensive survival mode while the privileged few will be in full scale acquisitive attack. Such was the case in the last depression. How history is repeating itself. Those who instigated the “off balance sheet” travesty knew exactly what they were doing. My advice is if you cannot beat them join them. Friends go to cash and the physical money metals as soon as you can. Contract your business and life-style expenses. Network and co-operate within a real community for the exchange of goods and services that sustain authentic life. Communities should learn how to issue local based, bearer-negotiable, split-barter, exchangeinstruments of agreed value; otherwise known as money. (Most people do not fully understand that money, in essence, is a social contract based on human trust and mutual benefit). Educate yourself regarding Social Credit. This “crisis event” is going to get much worse before it gets better folks. There will be short periods of reprieve but the reality of the problem is so serious and fundamental that it will take years, maybe decades (as in Japan), to work through, even with a R.T.C. (B) type solution. But perhaps it is true that “every cloud has a silver lining” and that “every problem bears within it the seeds of a greater opportunity”. Maybe finally after ninety five years the good people of the United States will awake from their media induced trance and realise that too much power was usurped by an elite on the 22nd. December 1913 when the privately owner Federal Reserve Bank was illegally formed.

Peaceful, proactive and constructive community must reassert its primacy over immoral, selfish and destructive institutionalism.

I will end with a quote which I think is most relevant:

“Now I come to my last statement. I regret ending on what is, I suppose, such a pessimistic note– I’m not personally pessimistic. The final result will be that the American people will ultimately prefer communities. They will cop out or opt out of the system. Today everything is a bureaucratic structure, and brainwashed people who are not personalities are trained to fit into this bureaucratic structure and say it is a great life–although I would assume that many on their death beds must feel otherwise. The process of coping out will take a long time, but notice: we are already coping out of military service on a wholesale basis; we are already copping out of voting on a large scale basis. I heard an estimate tonight that the President will probably be chosen by forty percent of the people eligible to vote for the forth time in sixteen years. People are also copping out by refusing to pay any attention to newspapers or to what’s going on in the world, and by increasing emphasis on the growth of localism, what is happening in their own neighbourhoods.

Now I want to say good night. Do not be pessimistic. Life goes on; life is fun. And if a civilization crashes, it deserves to. When Rome fell, the Christian answer was, “Create our own communities.”

Prof Carroll Quigley

Third Oscar Iden Lecture

Georgetown University 1978


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